a. Exposition of the Opinion

11. As to the first, the following is said [Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 5 q.16]. The Philosopher in Ethics 7.1-2.1145a15-b20 says that in every genus of goodness and badness it is possible to distinguish four grades. The first in the genus (that is, its beginning stage) is what by the Philosopher is called perseverance, the second grade is continence, the third temperance, and in the fourth is what is called heroic virtue. In the first two grades, to be sure, there is no virtue but only a certain imperfect disposition, on which perfect virtue naturally follows. In the third grade there is virtue commonly so called. But in the fourth grade the virtue is excellently so called, and exists in surpassing degree.

12. It is admitted, then, that in the first two grades there is not virtue, because in the habits of the virtues someone can be exercised in the acts of one virtue and not in those of another, and thus acquire perseverance as well as temperance, and one and not the other.

13. In the third grade a distinction is drawn, because virtue in that grade can be inchoate or average or perfect.

14. And so in the first two degrees [sc. of the third grade, the inchoate and average] there does not have to be a connection, for the same reason as before [n.12], because one can be exercised in the acts of one virtue according to these degrees and not in those of another.

15. But in the third degree of the third grade [n.13], and much more in the fourth grade [n.11], there is a connection.

16. The proof is multiple:

First as follows [Henry of Ghent Quodlibet 5 q.17]: “That is not perfect and true virtue which can fall away to the contrary of its end and fail, according to what Augustine says in a sermon about the works of mercy [Paulinus of Aquila, On Salutary Doctrines ch. 7, mistakenly included in the works of Augustine], ‘A charity that can be abandoned was never true’.” But if a moral virtue existed alone without the others, it could fall away from its end;     therefore it was not true virtue. The proof of the minor is that one virtue does not strengthen the will as regard other desirable things that it does not concern. Therefore , if the will only has this virtue, it can fall away as regard other desirable things that are presented to it. But by falling away as to these other things it can fall away as to the object of this virtue too; therefore etc     .

17. This is plain in an example: for he who has fortitude and not temperance is not firm in resisting delightful things. Similarly, he who has temperance and not fortitude is not firm in enduring terrible things. Therefore, if terrible and delightful things are presented to him at the same time, as that he commit fornication or undergo death, he can fall away as to the terrible things and so about the things of fortitude (and not about the things of temperance). For such a person would choose not to undergo death than not to fornicate, because he is not firm as to the terrible suffering.

18. A second argument to the same effect is as follows: it is a feature of virtue to work delightfully (from Ethics 2.5.1106a15-17); but one virtue without another is not a principle of delightful activity. The point is plain in the aforesaid example [n.17]. For if, when tempted as to intemperance, he does not have fortitude, he will, without delight, flee the things that belong to temperance, and so he is perfectly temperate only if he also has fortitude. An example can be put forward in the same way about avarice, that if someone is greedy he will choose to keep his money rather than his temperance.

19. Further, third as follows: perfect virtue leads to the end of virtue, because leading to the end is what perfection is in morals. But no virtue without the others leads one to the end, not oneself by oneself nor man in political community.     Therefore etc     .

20. There is a confirmation of this position in Gregory Moralia 22.1 n.2, “Whoever is held to be strong in virtue is then truly strong if he is not subject to vices on the other side.” And again 21.3 n.6, “One virtue without another is not perfect virtue, or rather is not virtue at all.” The commentator too on the beginning of Ethics 6 [Eustratius, On the Ethics 6 ch.6], “When temperance does not exist, how will there be justice?” - as if he were to say, “in no way will there be justice.” Again, the same commentator on the Ethics [ibid.], “We call temperance by this name [sc. so-phrosune in Greek] as being ‘what saves prudence’ [sozein phronesin];” and “The virtues are sisters to each other etc.”

21. The same is proved by the gloss on Revelation 21, “The city lies four square” [in Nicholas of Lyra 6 folio 272v “The four sides are the four principal virtues”].